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Thirty years after the launch of the “reform and opening up” policy,China finally implemented its first anti-trust law in 2008, a movelauded by an international law firm as a “tremendous leap forward”
that brought the country “squarely into the modern world of antitrust and
competition law.” (1) Yet, given the law’s novelty on Chinese soil, few would
have expected China to suddenly begin aggressively enforcing it. Since 2013,
Chinese anti-trust regulators have become active in deploying the anti-trust
law to initiate probes and impose hefty fines on industry associations, for-
eign carmakers, eyewear makers, and baby formula manufacturers, mean-
while justifying “dawn raids” on selected firms. Many of their high-profile
targets are multinational firms that until then enjoyed a comfortable pres-
ence in China. Facing tightened enforcement, foreign companies and cham-
bers of commerce are complaining that regulators are using the law
selectively against foreign firms and that investigations lack transparency
and respect for the rule of law. Chinese regulators, on the other hand, argue
that they are impartial towards domestic and foreign companies, and that
they are merely enforcing the anti-trust law in order to create a level playing
field for both domestic and foreign companies, benefit Chinese consumers,
and bring China closer to the rule of law.
Drawing upon this controversy, this article argues that China’s rising anti-
trust activism is explained by at least two factors. First, the Chinese state is
pursuing an industrial policy to encourage indigenous innovation and grow
national champions through a palette of regulatory tools. In this context,
enforcement of anti-trust law emerges as an important policy tool not only
to foster fair competition, but also to serve as a de facto interventionist
measure to pressure foreign enterprises to cut prices and oblige them to
contribute to the Chinese market and domestic companies. Second, the
growing aggressiveness of anti-trust enforcement is possibly fuelled by in-
ternal competition and political infighting among the three regulatory bod-
ies, which are all striving to gain political capital under the current uncertain
political climate. The article will demonstrate that the resulting complaints
from foreign companies and trade associations that they are being selec-
tively targeted are not totally unfounded. To show that the enforcement of
the anti-trust law is impartial, Chinese regulators must demonstrate its
strength and willingness by striking hard against the monopolistic practices
of domestic companies – particularly the powerful state-owned enterprises. 
Anti-monopoly law and recent enforcement
After almost 15 years of drafting, China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) was
finally promulgated in August 2007 and became effective one year later. (2)
Recognised as China’s “economic constitution,” the AML is China’s first com-
prehensive competition law that oversees issues including merger control,
monopoly agreements by multiple firms, and abuse of dominant market
position. Its declared purposes include protecting market competition and
the legitimate interests of consumers, and above all, protecting public in-
terest and promoting the socialist market economy. The law is enforced by
three governmental bodies. The National Development Reform Commission
(NDRC), China’s top planning agency responsible for the administrative con-
trol of the economy, is tasked with overseeing pricing-related monopoly
practices while retaining authority under the Price Law (1997). The State
Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) takes care of non-pric-
ing-related monopoly practices. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) is
responsible for merger review and monopolisation in foreign trade. Apart
from the three enforcement agencies, the State Council has established the
Anti-Monopoly Commission. A consultation and coordination body with no
substantive enforcement powers, the Commission is responsible for organ-
ising, coordinating and supervising AML-related activities. 
During the first few years of implementation, Chinese regulators re-
mained largely dormant in enforcing the anti-trust law. Apart from the
blocking of Coca Cola’s acquisition of Hui Yuan Juice Group by the Ministry
of Commerce in 2009 and piecemeal efforts by the NDRC and SAIC to
punish local industry associations and companies for monopolistic prac-
tices, the focus of investigation remained regional, and the scale of the
probes and the fines imposed were small. However, beginning in 2013, as
Xi Jinping took over the Party leadership position from Hu Jintao, Chinese
regulators turned militant and briskly stepped up efforts to crack down on
monopolistic practices. At the start of 2013, the NDRC fined Chinese liquor
maker Wuliangye and Kweichow Maotai a record total of 449 million yuan
for resale price maintenance. The focus of investigation was subsequently
expanded to cover foreign companies. Six Korean and Taiwanese manufac-
turers of LCD panels were fined 353 million yuan by the NDRC for forming
an international price cartel. Then in August 2013, another six manufac-
turers of baby formula were fined 669 million yuan for resale price main-
tenance – all but one had foreign investment. In February 2014, the NDRC
launched a probe into US mobile chipset maker Qualcomm, a key supplier
to the domestic telecommunication sector, on suspicion of overcharging
customers. In May 2014, five foreign eyewear manufacturers, including
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Johnson & Johnson and Nikon, paid a total penalty of 19 million yuan for
price manipulation. 
A new spate of anti-trust activism primarily targeting foreign firms gained
pace as the AML celebrated its sixth anniversary. In early August 2014, as
part of anti-trust investigations into foreign automakers, the NDRC paid a
surprise visit to the Shanghai office of Daimler AG’s luxury auto unit Mer-
cedes-Benz, where officials interrogated senior executives and confiscated
computers. About a week later, the agency announced fines on Audi
(250 million yuan) and Chrysler (32 million yuan), as well as a total penalty
of 1.2 billion yuan on 12 Japanese auto parts makers. At around the same
time, the SAIC, which had until then played a less proactive role than the
NDRC, came to the fore by conducting two rounds of coordinated “dawn
raids” against Microsoft’s offices in four Chinese cities for alleged anti-mo-
nopoly practices. The Dalian office of Accenture Plc., Microsoft’s financial
service provider and a foreign consulting firm, was also included in the search.
Antitrust enforcement as part of China’s
techno-nationalism 
While the intensification of anti-trust investigations demonstrated Chi-
nese regulators’ growing confidence in disciplining the market with the
AML, its focus on multinational brands also highlighted China’s long-stand-
ing distrust of foreign companies. Although China’s openness to foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) has contributed greatly to its exceptional economic
performance, the Chinese government is increasingly wary of the presence
of foreign firms as officials aim to build a strong domestic consumption
market and capable domestic players. Foreign brands are more often ac-
cused of overcharging Chinese customers, who in turn have to pay higher
prices for the same products than in other countries. (3) In addition, there
are growing concerns over the corrupted practices of foreign businesses
operating in China. The Chinese authorities have taken legal action against,
for example, executives in the British-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto for
industrial espionage and bribery in 2009, (4) and later against executives of
the British pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline on allegations of
bribing hospitals, doctors, and health institutions to boost sales in 2013. (5)
Perhaps a more fundamental source of distrust stems from growing con-
cerns that the presence of foreign companies might be harmful to China’s
state security and national interest. Such concerns are particularly salient
in the information and technology sector, which is viewed by the Party lead-
ership as a strategic industry to national development. (6) China has long
maintained that the country must reduce reliance on foreign technology
suppliers to protect state secrets and promote its domestic technology sec-
tor. The proposition was greatly reinforced in 2013 after former US intelli-
gence contractor Edward Snowden leaked classified documents about the
US global surveillance programme, which revealed systematic hacking of
Chinese targets by the US National Security Agency. China used the incident
to lodge protests against US attempts at large-scale cyber attacks, and in
return the US Department of Justice indicted five named hackers from
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for computer hacking and economic
espionage. The impact of tension over cyber-espionage was soon felt in re-
lations between the Chinese government and foreign tech firms operating
in the country. In late 2013, eight US technology companies, including Mi-
crosoft, Cisco, Oracle and Intel, were named and shamed by Chinese state
media as the eight “guardian warriors” (bada jingang 八大金刚) collaborat-
ing with the US government. A report published by China Economic Weekly,
a magazine owned by state mouthpiece People’s Daily, listed projects the
companies ran with China’s government agencies and companies, insinu-
ating attempts to infiltrate Chinese government and business networks and
information while implying close links with the US government. (7)
Among these “guardian warriors,” Microsoft was particularly targeted by
the authorities long before the SAIC’s “dawn raids” in July and August 2014.
Uneasy that dependence on Microsoft products makes it vulnerable to se-
curity leaks, the Chinese government has tried shifting to other operating
systems and software, such as Linux products, while announcing the devel-
opment of a home-grown OS. (8) Following an alleged industry complaint,
the SAIC began an investigation into Microsoft in June 2013 over issues in
compatibility, bundling, and document authentication for its Windows op-
erating system and Office software, on the charge of violating China’s anti-
trust regulations. In May 2014, the Central Government Procurement Center
announced that it would forbid the use of the Windows 8 operating system
in new government computers in an effort to ensure computer security fol-
lowing Microsoft’s plans to retire its Windows XP operating system. (9) After
the July and August raids, the SAIC even issued a statement “officially warn-
ing” Microsoft to obey Chinese law and “not to interfere with or hinder the
investigation in any way.” (10)
Anxiety with foreign technology further extended to other products, with
foreign antivirus software brands, including the US-based Symantec and
Russia’s Kaspersky, being excluded from the government procurement list
of approved software vendors due to fears that they could be turned into
tools of cyber-espionage. (11) Even the popular Apple products caught the
attention of cautious government authorities. In July 2014, state television
CCTV broadcasted a report alleging that the Apple iPhone was a threat to
national security because of its location-tracking app, an allegation that
Apple Inc. flatly denied. (12) Bloomberg reported that the NDRC and the Min-
istry of Finance excluded ten Apple products – including the iPad series and
MacBook series – from a government procurement list due to security con-
cerns. (13) Perhaps most symbolic of all, China’s First Lady Peng Liyuan, who
was photographed by the press using an iPhone in June 2013, had switched
to a Nubia Z5 mini, a model manufactured by Chinese mobile phone maker
ZTE Corporation, in a picture taken in March 2014. (14)
54 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 4 / 4
3. Adam Jourdan, “Starbucks under media fire in China for high prices,” Reuters, 21 October 2013;
Kevin Yao and Matthew Miller, “China accuses Qualcomm of overcharging, abusing dominance,”
Reuters, 19 February 2014. 
4. David Barboza, “China Sentences Rio Tinto Employees in Bribe Case,” The New York Times, 
29 March 2010. 
5. “Bribery by GSK China was coordinated at company level: Xinhua,” Reuters, 3 September 2013. 
6. “China to nurture 7 new strategic industries in 2011-15,” Xinhua, 27 October 2010. 
7. “Meiguo ‘bada jingang’ shentou Zhongguo da qidi” (Investigation into America’s eight guardian
warriors infiltrating China), China Economic Weekly, Vol. 24, 2013, http://paper.people.com.cn/
zgjjzk/html/2013-06/24/content_1259857.htm (accessed on 24 October 2014). 
8. Adam Segal, “China has a history of not trusting Microsoft on cybersecurity,” Council on Foreign
Relations, 30 July 2014; “China targets own operating system to take on likes of Microsoft,
Google,” Reuters, 24 August 2014. 
9. “China excludes Windows 8 from government computers,” China Daily, 20 May 2014; Austin
Ramzy, “China warns of risks in plan to retire Windows XP,” The New York Times, 9 March 2014. 
10. Dan Levin, “China Tells Microsoft Not to Interfere With Inquiry,” The New York Times, 4 August
2014. 
11. Jim Finkle, “Beijing to bar Symantec, Kaspersky anti-virus in procurement: Report,” Reuters, 3 Au-
gust 2014. 
12. “Frequent locations could leak state secrets,” The Guardian, 14 July 2014. 
13. “China said to exclude Apple from procurement list,” Bloomberg, 9 August 2014.
14. Amy Li, “Peng Liyuan snapped using an iPhone despite China’s war of words with Apple,” South
China Morning Post, 3 June 2013; Chris Luo, “‘Nubia’, not iPhone, is Chinese first lady Peng Liyuan’s
latest choice of smart phone,” South China Morning Post, 30 March 2014. 
Current affairs
While China’s heightening hostility towards foreign firms might appear to
be a new trend, it is in fact the expression of a long-standing techno-na-
tionalism at the heart of China’s economic policy-making. Rooted back in
the late Qing dynasty in the intellectual discourse of “Chinese learning as
substance; Western learning as application” (zhongti xiyong 中体西用), the
imperative for China to catch up with the West on science and technology
and their linkage to national development were persistent themes through-
out the twentieth century. It was expressed during the Mao era through the
Party-state’s nationalistic efforts to boost indigenous capabilities so as to
“overtake Britain and catch up with the US” (chaoying ganmei 超英赶美),
then during the Deng-era of “reform and opening up” in crowning science
and technology as one of the four pillars of China’s modernisation. These
goals were further articulated in national policy-making as China became
one of the world’s largest economies. Since the mid-2000s, China an-
nounced the guiding principle of developing “indigenous innovation” (zizhu
chuangxin 自主创新), and enshrined it as a national strategy that put sci-
entific and technological development at the core of rebalancing China’s
industrial structure and development pattern. (15) The National Mid-to-Long-
term Science and Technology Development Plan (MLP) was launched by
the State Council in 2006, aiming to build up a leading science-based in-
dustry by the year 2020 while helping Chinese companies move up the
value chain from producing labour-intensive to high-technology prod-
ucts. (16) The plan identified major research programs for the next 15 years
and 27 breakthrough technologies, while vowing to give preferential treat-
ment to Chinese firms bidding for government procurement contracts if
they owned the intellectual property rights they would use in the manu-
facturing process. In 2010, the Central Committee announced a plan to de-
velop seven strategic industries – all of them technology-related – including
information technology, energy-saving and environmental protection, en-
ergy, biology, high-end equipment manufacturing, materials, and energy
cars, vowing to boost fiscal, tax and financial policy support, planning guid-
ance, and major state-level projects to develop them into pillar industries. (17)
An industrial policy to push for foreign
concessions
Apart from a strong will to boost the technology sector, the Chinese gov-
ernment has also demonstrated its preference for large firms and companies
capable of competing internationally. Scholars have long noted that China’s
economic policies tend to lean towards large-scale industries in the hope
of emulating the developmental pathway of East Asian neighbours such as
Japan and South Korea, where state support has played a key role in building
globally powerful major corporations. Since the 1990s, under the slogan of
“grasping the large and letting the small go” (zhuada fangxiao 抓大放小),
Chinese economic policy-makers in the State Council began building na-
tional champions by selecting 120 large enterprises groups from sectors
considered to be of strategic importance, and nurturing them with a high
level of protection and large-scale state financial support. (18) Similar policies
were also aimed at focal (zhongdian 重点) large and medium enterprises. (19)
Meanwhile, China’s state planning system also underwent massive restruc-
turing to become more adaptive to economic transformation and more ef-
fective in steering development. (20) Most notably, the NDRC has
transformed itself from a central planning authority to a new role as a
macro-economic coordinator, and is now responsible for matters such as
macro-economic planning (including coordinating the five-year plans), proj-
ect and investment approval, resource pricing, and investment fund alloca-
tion. 
The heightened enforcement of the AML on foreign firms should not be
seen in isolation. It appears to be part of a long string of measures that the
Chinese authorities have employed to build up and protect domestic in-
dustries. It belongs to a large palette of policy tools, including state subsi-
dies, policy support, bank loans, and government procurement programs,
meant to support or discipline companies as well as to exclude powerful
foreign or unfriendly competitors. It is also consistent with the techno-na-
tionalistic policy requiring foreign firms to contribute to the Chinese econ-
omy by developing technology within China, partnering and transferring
skills to Chinese firms, or contributing to the Chinese economy as prereq-
uisites to gaining access to domestic customers. As Xu Kunlin, director gen-
eral of NDRC’s price supervision and anti-monopoly bureau, candidly
remarked, “given that China is still at the catch-up and overtake stage, in-
dustrial policy needs to play its critical role in China’s economic develop-
ment.” (21)
One expedient outcome of enforcing AML is to put pressure on companies
such that they are willing to cut prices in exchange for a more lenient treat-
ment from regulators. In the case of Mercedes-Benz, for example, the com-
pany announced that it would lower prices on more than 10,000 spare parts
by an average of 15% shortly after anti-trust regulators conducted a surprise
raid at their Shanghai office. This cut followed a sweeping reduction of prices
for repair and maintenance services in the previous month. (22) Similar re-
medial actions to cut product prices were also taken by Japanese automak-
ers including Toyota, Honda, and Nissan on auto spare parts in response to
the spread of anti-trust investigations in the auto industry, and by foreign
milk powder makers such as Mead Johnson, Abbott, and Nestlé in response
to fines imposed on them. (23) As a result, even though the claimed objective
of ensuring fair market competition might not be immediately achieved,
price cuts by foreign firms often come first as a direct and immediate con-
sequence of anti-trust enforcement. One reason might have to do with the
fact that the NDRC has a long-standing mandate to control prices in the
Chinese market. In this context, anti-trust enforcement merely emerges as
a new interventionist measure enabling its officials to force firms to slash
prices. (24) Admittedly, the result might benefit Chinese companies and do-
mestic consumers paying lower prices for the same products to foreign ven-
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dors and brands. (25) But other observers believe that forcing popular foreign
brands to lower prices might enable them to gain an even greater market
share and subsequently harm low-cost entrants. They warned that regula-
tors must consider long-term implications and use more appropriate reme-
dies, such as demanding changes to supplier contracts and relationships,
rather than simply pushing for price reductions. (26)
Second, anti-trust enforcement serves as a signal to foreign companies
that they must add value to China’s economic development instead of just
profiting from the deep pockets of Chinese consumers, a problem the Chi-
nese authorities are dealing with increasing seriousness. During the course
of “reform and opening up,” China has always expected foreign companies
to transfer technology to domestic firms as an indication of their commit-
ment to China’s growth and development. In the automotive industry, for
example, foreign carmakers are required to enter into joint ventures with
local partners and share technology with them as a prerequisite to selling
cars to Chinese customers. The MLP, which was promulgated in 2006, further
institutionalised such requirements of technology transfer. It requires for-
eign companies who wish to compete for government contracts to commit
to transferring their proprietary technology and intellectual property to Chi-
nese partners. In the words of a supply chain specialist, “if China doesn’t
feel it is learning from a business, or a business is just exploiting an advan-
tage it has, it will gently or abruptly stop it (for example with import tariffs
or corruption investigations, or more subtly with changes to joint venture
ownerships, ease of doing business, or taxation).” (27)
But foreign firms are often offended by this requirement. They fear that
their intellectual property and strategy secrets could be leaked to Chinese
players during the process of technology transfer. The MLP was even char-
acterised by some of them as “a blueprint for technology theft on a scale
the world has never seen,” a sharp indication of its unpopularity among
multinational firms. (28)
Nevertheless, despite protests from foreign companies, China has insisted
on viewing technology transfer as an entry ticket to the Chinese market. A
2006 report by the NDRC stated that foreign direct investment had not
created enough technological spill-over for the Chinese economy because
foreign companies were “abusing” (lanyong 滥用) the protection of intel-
lectual property rights, which would impede possibilities for domestic firms
to undertake indigenous innovations. (29) The firmly held position by the Chi-
nese government was even written into the AML. Article 55 states that the
Law “shall apply to the conduct of business operators to eliminate or restrict
market competition by abusing their intellectual property rights.” (30) Al-
though references to intellectual property rights are commonly featured in
the competition laws of many jurisdictions around the world, in the Chinese
context the vaguely defined word of “abuse” in the AML offers huge room
for interpretation. Anti-trust regulators are thus equipped with major dis-
cretionary powers over how to deploy the AML as disciplinary tools to re-
ward and punish enterprises. To some extent, this turns enforcement of the
AML into a legislative tool for administrative purposes so as to bring about
technology transfer from firms that are more technologically capable, and
discipline those that do not comply with the rule. If firms are willing to meet
the terms set out both formally and informally by Chinese regulators, they
could be exempted from probes or given lighter consequences if they are
under investigation. In fact, Chinese anti-trust regulators have the ability to
terminate investigations without imposing fines provided that the violating
party promises to change its practices, and they also have the discretionary
power to adopt a more flexible (while also arbitrary and opaque) approach
in imposing penalties. This perhaps explains why Qualcomm announced in
July 2014 that it would commit to a $150 million “strategic venture fund”
that invests in Chinese technology start-up companies across all stages, es-
pecially in the following areas: Internet, e-commerce, semi-conductor, ed-
ucation and health. (31) Other companies sought to gain access to the
Chinese market by choosing a compliant strategy from the very beginning.
LinkedIn, a social networking platform for professionals and executives, is a
notable example of foreign firms seeking to play by local rules. As a well-
positioned player in making Chinese employment market more efficient
and thus stimulating the economy, LinkedIn is likely to enjoy more auton-
omy in navigating the Chinese market given its active compliance. (32)
Political infighting between Chinese
regulators
Another thrust of anti-trust activism is generated by a different set of dy-
namics: the internal strife between Chinese anti-trust regulators. Jamil An-
derlini, Beijing bureau chief for Financial Times, brought up this point,
suggesting that the anti-trust campaign that has been primarily led by the
NDRC “has more to do with institutional infighting and internal political turf
wars than a master plan to exclude foreign investors from the country.” (33)
As Anderlini pointed out, the reason that the NDRC was increasingly aggres-
sive in enforcing the AML was that the NDRC has become “one of the biggest
institutional losers in the administrative reforms introduced by Mr. Xi [Jin-
ping].” Arguably one of China’s most powerful bureaucracies, the NDRC was
once the country’s top economic planning agency that oversaw the process
of licensing, planning, and approval for investment projects and five-year
plans. However, these powers have been significantly curtailed since Xi took
power, and as a result of the streamlining of government and the delegation
of responsibility to the lower levels (jianzheng fangquan 简政放权) as well
as the shortening or cancellation of administrative approval processes. After
the Third Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee, President Xi took per-
sonal charge of a newly set up small leading group for deepening reform,
tasked with overseeing national economic strategy under the pledge to give
a “decisive role” to market forces in allocating resources. This leading group
further ate into the power of the State Council and the NDRC in managing
the country’s economic affairs. These changes, argued Anderlini, contributed
to the decline of the NDRC’s standing within the state bureaucracy, together
with its ability to “seek rents and procure bribes.” 
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To regain importance as well as to adhere to Xi’s vision of market reforms,
the NDRC must transform itself from a cumbersome economic planning
agency into a lean macro-economic coordinator and regulator that is able
to take up a more relevant role under an increasingly market-driven Chinese
economy. (34) One possible direction for revamping the NDRC is to enhance
the agency’s role as the country’s major anti-trust regulator, for which it is
legitimately positioned. (35) This helps explain why the NDRC has turned
proactive in enforcing anti-trust regulations in the past two years. Targeting
well-known foreign brands will be effective in highlighting the NDRC’s new
role because it is likely to make good headlines, and such cases are easy to
present as showing that the NDRC is serving the interests of Chinese con-
sumers. In light of the NDRC’s increasingly proactive role in punishing for-
eign firms for anti-trust violations, the fact that the SAIC began to flex its
muscle by initiating probes and raids on Microsoft spurred speculation that
the agencies are jockeying for position in the midst of growing debate over
whether to have a single agency rather than three responsible for enforcing
the Anti-Monopoly Law. (36) In December 2013, NDRC anti-trust chief Xu
Kunlin said in China Daily that he favoured merging the three anti-trust
agencies, which have overlapping responsibilities, into one government en-
forcement body. He also quoted the opening phrase – “The empire, long di-
vided, must unite” – from the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, a classic
Chinese novel based on the power struggles of three warring states fighting
for dominance in the post-Han dynasty. (37) If Xu’s ambition was indeed to
turn his agency into the country’s sole anti-trust body, then the SAIC’s high-
profile move against Microsoft is at least one major obstacle in making his
ambition come true. 
Complaints from abroad and state responses
Regardless of the motivation and dynamics behind recent anti-trust
probes, the scale and intensity were sufficient in creating shockwaves across
the community of foreign firms operating in China. Two recent surveys con-
ducted by US business associations illustrated growing concerns that US
companies were being targeted by Beijing in the anti-trust crusade. One
conducted by the US-China Business Council showed that 86% of its mem-
ber companies are concerned about Beijing’s anti-trust enforcement, with
30% fearing the law will be used against them. They are worried that the
AML was passed more to protect China’s domestic industry than to promote
fair competition, and that the law is used to force foreign companies to
slash prices. (38) Another one, done by Beijing’s American Chamber of Com-
merce, found that 60% of respondents believe that foreign business is less
welcome in China than before, up from 41% last year. Meanwhile, nearly
half of the respondents said they have been targeted in either the anti-mo-
nopoly or anti-corruption campaigns. (39) Back in April 2014, the US Chamber
of Commerce sent a private letter to Secretary of State John Kerry and Treas-
ury Secretary Jacob Lew. The letter urged Washington to take a tough stance
against Beijing on the issue of anti-trust enforcement because the “Chinese
government has seized on using the AML to promote Chinese producer wel-
fare and to advance industrial policies that nurture domestic enterprises.” (40)
In a similar vein, the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China com-
plained that “foreign companies are being disproportionately targeted.” (41)
Observers complained that the investigations often lack due process and
transparency, and that regulators sometimes use threats and even torture
in forcing executives to admit wrongdoing. (42) Moreover, results of investi-
gations and penalties are usually opaque and incompletely disclosed, or
only disclosed after a considerable period of time. (43) All this has further
stirred up the worries of foreign companies over their long-term operations
in China. Coincidentally, there has been the recent decline in the amount
of foreign direct investment in China, which might well be a reflection of
these worries. (44)
Chinese state media responded to these growing fears by saying that critics
had misunderstood the nature of China’s antitrust investigations. In an article
entitled “Why is the US making a fuss over China’s antitrust campaign?”,
People’s Daily argued that China’s anti-trust investigations do not justify
such over-reaction from the US, pointing out that anti-monopoly laws and
regulations have been and will be applied equally to foreign and home-grown
companies. (45) Quoting figures from a progress briefing jointly held by the
three anti-regulators, the article stated that of the 335 companies and in-
dustry associations investigated by the NDRC, only 33 are foreign. It added
that recent probes into Microsoft and Tetra Pak make up only two out of the
39 cases filed under the SAIC, the rest of which involved Chinese companies
and associations. The article concluded by saying that China is not the only
country enforcing anti-trust laws and regulations, pointing to the fact that
the US Department of Justice launched nearly 100 investigations in 2013
and thus criticising their “double standard” in view of similar actions in China.
Chinese regulators elsewhere said they have also targeted domestic giants
such as China Telecom and China Unicom for anti-monopoly practices in the
broadband market as an example of fairness to both foreign and domestic
companies – even though the cases have failed to result in any tangible out-
comes, possibly due to pressures from higher-ups. (46)
Is anti-trust enforcement fair-handed?
While foreign companies might make up of a small proportion of anti-
trust investigations in terms of the number of cases filed, it is an opposite
case for the amount of fines imposed on them by Chinese regulators. As
Graph 1 shows, almost 80% of the total fines reported by the NDRC were
imposed on foreign companies, even though they only make up around
10% of the investigations. The average amount of fines imposed on foreign
companies violating anti-trust regulations is around 80 million yuan per
company, eight times the amount imposed on domestic firms. 
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In addition, there have been a number of eyewitness accounts describing
“administrative intimidation tactics” used by regulators during anti-trust
investigations. One report recounted how lawyers from foreign firms were
“gathered in a room” and warned by an NDRC official “not to challenge its
inquiries or risk facing extreme penalties.” Others are told not to bring in
lawyers, challenge investigations in court, or involve their respective gov-
ernments or chambers of commerce. (47) A Reuters report called this “a cul-
ture of intimidation under the leadership of Director General Xu Kunlin,”
quoting lawyers who said that the antitrust bureau has used “widespread
behind-the-scenes tactics – from personal threats to forced apologies and
brow beatings” – to enforce anti-monopoly laws and regulations. It even
compared these tactics to those used by Red Guards during the Cultural
Revolution, which is typically a serious accusation of mob-like activity. (48)
Even domestic observers are questioning the legality of anti-trust investi-
gations. Liu Xu, a Chinese legal researcher, raised nine problems with the
campaign in a three-part article using the NDRC’s probe into Qualcomm
as an example. These problems include enforcing the law beyond the
agency’s jurisdiction, using the wrong legal clauses, lack of evidence, re-
stricting the right to defence and the right to hearing, lack of information
disclosure, excessive discretion in dishing out administrative punishment,
doubts over the agency’s independence, selective and subjective enforce-
ment, and the idling of the Anti-Monopoly Commission. (49)
All of this suggests that fair treatment of domestic and foreign companies
by Chinese anti-trust regulations is at least a questionable claim. To defend
this claim, Chinese regulators must show not just fairness in their willingness
or attempts to investigate both domestic and foreign players, but also fair-
ness and equal treatment in the process and result of the investigations.
Chinese authorities must also demonstrate that they are willing to pursue
powerful domestic players. Observers are already questioning why anti-trust
investigations are not targeting the powerful and well-connected state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), especially as China has embarked on a plan to
consolidate around 150 SOEs into between 80 and 100 big firms. (50) SCMP
chief editor Wang Xiangwei, for example, asked in a Twitter posting whether
the anti-trust probe will take on the “obvious monopoly by PetroChina and
Sinopec.” (51) Although the principle of safeguarding public interests listed
in the AML might well become a layer of protection for SOEs, Chinese reg-
ulators must show their real teeth by removing the protective coat and
striking at all monopolistic practices, whether they are committed by for-
eign or domestic firms. 
Conclusion
Over the past two years, China’s anti-trust regulators have been gradually
building up their confidence in enforcing the six-year old Anti-Monopoly
Law. By launching high-profile probes into a score of foreign companies and
imposing exorbitant penalties on them, China is demonstrating its growing
intolerance of foreign malpractice in China and an increasing willingness to
discipline market players in accordance with domestic regulations. However,
as this article shows, anti-trust enforcement has been inseparable from mo-
tives and dynamics other than ensuring free competition. It is fuelled by a
deep-rooted techno-nationalistic sentiment to link science and technology
development to national well-being, to protect national security, and to
nurture domestic technology firms into some of the world’s best. Anti-trust
measures are among a range of regulatory – or even interventionist – meas-
ures to pressure foreign firms to cut prices and make them contribute more
tangibly to the Chinese economy from China’s perspective, such that do-
mestic firms can benefit. Seen in this light, the enforcement of the AML re-
flects how the Chinese state is using its visible hands (kandejian de shou 看
得见的手) in combination with the invisible hands of the market (kanbujian
de shou 看不见的手). (52) In doing so, anti-trust regulators are not “regula-
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tors” in the traditional sense, but regulators who play a much more proac-
tive role in shaping the course of national development, and who have their
own private interests and calculations to survive and perform in the political
system.
While it is indeed inaccurate to say that foreign firms are being dispro-
portionally targeted in investigations, it would be equally inaccurate to
claim that regulatory authorities have given fair treatment to foreign and
domestic companies alike, and that the investigation process is transparent
and in accordance with the rule of law. To demonstrate the case otherwise,
anti-trust regulators must not only uphold legal procedures during investi-
gations and enhance transparency on the whole process; they must also
step out of their comfort zone to toughen up on the powerful state-owned
giants that have obvious monopolistic traits. Doing so, however, is not just
a politically demanding task in the face of powerful interest groups in the
Party-state bureaucracy, but also one that ironically conflicts with the am-
bition of the NDRC to become China’s largest and only anti-trust regulator. 
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